



IPSec

Internet Protocol Security

Mario Baldi

Synchrodyne Networks, Inc.

<http://www.mario-baldi.net>





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Overview

- **Application layer security**
 - **Security e-mail**
 - **S/MIME**
 - **DNS security extensions**
 - **SSH (Secure SHell): secure telnet**
 - **Transport layer security**
 - **SSL (Secure Socket Layer)**
 - **Network layer Security**
 - **IPSec**
 - **Protection of IP, TCP, and UDP headers**
 - **Authentication of IP, TCP, and UDP headers**
- 





Security Objectives

- Confidentiality

- No unauthorized access

- Integrity

- No unauthorized modification

- Authentication

- No source faking (spoofing)

- Non repudiation

- No pretending not to be the source
- 





IPsec

- A framework to address security issues
 - Standard
 - Flexible
- Based on cryptography
- Tunneling is possibly used
- Transparent to applications
 - Transparent to users





IPsec and Cryptography


- One shared pair of session keys per communicating direction
 - one for data encryption
 - one for authentication
- Shared keys must be agreed upon
- Session keys are changed regularly to increase robustness
- Key exchange
 - Manual (out-of-band)
 - Dynamic, automatic: IKE



Security Association (SA)

- Agreements that enable data exchange
- An exchange providing authentication and privacy requires a separate SA for each

An SA includes

- Session keys
 - IP address of each endpoint
 - It can be a subnet prefix
 - IP address of each IPSec gateway
 - Expiration of session keys
 - Upon session keys expiration a new Security Association is to be created
- 





IKE (Internet Key Exchange)

- Means to agree upon

- Protocols

- Algorithms

- Encryption

- DES

- 3DES

- RC5

- Cast

- Authentication: message digest

- MD5

- SHA1

- Keys


- Shared secret

- Communicated off-line

- Digital certificates



IKE (Internet Key Exchange)

- Authentication of other communicating party
 - E.g., tunnel endpoint
 - Digital certificates to validate public keys
 - Including authentication of communicating party
 - Key exchanges
 - Diffie-Hellman algorithm
 - Public key cryptography to sign key exchanges
 - Guarantees for identities of the two parties
 - DES (Data Encryption Standard) to encrypt keys being exchanged
- 





IKE (Internet Key Exchange)

Combines various standards (confusing)

- ISAKMP: Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol

- Generic negotiation protocol
- Packet format and protocol description

- DOI: Domain of Interpretation

- IPsec specific interpretation of ISAKMP

- OAKLEY

- Key management framework
- Canonical key negotiation sequences

- SKEME

- Key management framework

- Parts used within IKE





Implementation

- Client implementation
- Gateway implementation
 - Software: on firewall or router
 - Hardware: special purpose box
- Algorithm independence



Transport Mode Encapsulation

- Host to host communications
- Information between ESP (Encapsulation Security Payload) header and trailer is encrypted
 - Security Parameter Index (SPI)
 - Pointer in SA database → encryption type
- ESP trailer: authentication
 - Message authentication code (MAC)
 - From transport (TCP/UDP) to MAC (excluded)



 Authenticated

 Encrypted

Transport Mode Encapsulation


- Authentication header
 - SPI
 - With or without ESP
 - MAC over the entire packet
 - no TTL, ToS, fragmentation information, etc.



■ Authenticated ▨ Encrypted


(IPsec) Tunneling

- IPsec tunneling ensures security
- Deployed in IPsec VPNs
 - A and B are enterprise addresses
 - they do not have to satisfy the public system requirements
 - Tunneling enables operation



Tunnel Mode Encapsulation

- Gateway (X) to gateway (Y) communications



■ Authenticated

▨ Encrypted

IPSec Gateway and Firewall

■ Inside

- No inspection of encrypted traffic
- IPSec gateway protected by firewall

■ Parallel


- Potential uncontrolled access

■ Outside

- IPSec gateway protected by access router
- Consistent policy


■ Integrated

- Maximum flexibility






IPSec Gateway and NAT

- Authentication Header (AH)
 - IP addresses are part of AH checksum calculation → packets discarded
 - Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP)
 - Port might be hidden → no address expansion
 - No PAT (Port Address Translation)
 - Tunnel mode
 - IP address within secure packet can be changed before entering the gateway
 - E.g., same addresses in two different VPN sites
 - Most often NAT is not needed on external packet
- 



IPSec Gateway and IDS

- IDS is usually outside the firewall
- No control on encrypted traffic
- Multiple IDS probes
 - Outside firewall
 - Inside IPSec gateway





References

- S. Kent and R. Atkinson, “Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol,” RFC 2401, November 1998.
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- S. Kent and R. Atkinson, “IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP),” RFC 2406, November 1998.
- S. Kent and R. Atkinson, “IP Authentication Header,” RFC 2402, November 1998.

